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Abstract
It is commonly observed in practices that prime contractors solicit subcontract
bids, prior to submitting their bids in procurement auctions: the auctioneers in
subcontract auctions will become bidders in a procurement auction. This point is
remarkably diﬀerent from the standard theory of procurement auction. We pre-
sented a simple model of such subcontract auctions and conducted a laboratory
experiment to examine the bidding behavior derived theoretically. We observed
that in the subcontract auction, (1) subjects bid following the equilibrium bid-
ding function derived theoretically, (2) the revenue equivalence between ﬁrst-price
and second-price mechanisms breaks down, and (3) the ﬁrst-price mechanism more
likely achieves ex post eﬃcient allocations than the second-price mechanism.
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11 Introduction
It is commonly observed in practices that, to make lower bids in procurement auctions,
prime contractors solicit bids and make subcontract agreements with the agents who
can complete subcontractable works with lower costs than the prime contractors do
by themselves. Accordingly, the auctioneers in the “upstream” subcontract auctions
will become bidders in a “downstream” procurement auction. This point is remarkably
diﬀerent from the standard theory of procurement auctions. (See, e.g., Rezende (2009)
and references therein.) This paper casts light on how subcontractors behave in such
a subcontract auction in order not only to learn about their bidding behavior but also
to draw relevant policy implications towards practical procurement auctions.
We ﬁrst present a simple model of subcontract bidding based on Nakabayashi (2009).
It is, however, extremely diﬃcult to collect a complete set of ﬁeld data of subcontract
bids in many countries: the results of procurement auctions are publicly opened to
observe, whereas in subcontract auctions few agents can observe actual bids. So, by
using the data obtained by the laboratory experiment, we next examine some theoretical
predictions statistically.
In our model, there are two prime contractors competing for a procurement. Before
the procurement auction, each prime contractor solicits bids from two subcontractors.
These subcontractors cannot submit their bids to the other prime contractor. So, there
are four subcontractors in total. Each subcontractor knows his or her own cost for
completing the subcontract work, but no one else can observe it. In each subcontract
auction, only the auctioneer and bidders can observe bids, and the lowest bidder makes
a subcontract agreement with the prime contractor. If the prime contractor wins the
procurement, then the subcontractor obtains the subcontract work and is paid by the
prime contractor. Otherwise, the subcontractor obtains nothing.
The main observation in our experiment is as follows. (1) In the subcontract auction
with the ﬁrst-price mechanism, subjects bid following the equilibrium bidding function
derived from our theoretical model, and the second price mechanism successfully in-
duced the bidders’ truth-telling of their cost for the subcontract work. (2) The revenue
equivalence between ﬁrst-price and second-price mechanisms breaks down even under
the independent private value (IPV) environment, because of the aggressive bidding in
the case of a ﬁrst-price mechanism. (3) The ﬁrst-price mechanism more likely achieves
ex post eﬃcient allocations than the second-price mechanism.
The above observation (1) implies that our model captures the bidding behavior in
the subcontract auctions. The observations (2) and (3) are both matched with theo-
retical predictions. The observation (3) in particular suggests that prime contractors
should employ the ﬁrst-price mechanism for the subcontract auction, which is recom-
mended also from the viewpoint of the social welfare maximization.
2We assume in this paper that the prime contractors’ costs for completing non-
subcontractable works are all normalized as zero. Prime contractors are faced with
positive amounts of those costs in practices. This situation is, however, so complicated
that each subcontractor needs to estimate those costs of all prime contractors in order
to decide his or her subcontract bid, while taking into account information about the
costs of all subcontractors: even if a subcontractor wins a subcontract agreement with
a prime contractor, he or she is paid nothing unless the prime contractor wins in
a procurement auction. So, as the ﬁrst step of this research strand on subcontract
auctions, we simplify the situation by assuming that those costs are zero, and examine
whether or not subjects in the experiment can infer the optimal bidding strategies.
We further assume in our model that any collusive arrangements are not allowed in
both subcontract and procurement auctions. It is sometimes reported in practices that
procurement oﬃcials use their discretion to decide which ﬁrms are qualiﬁed to submit
bids. In this case, bidders may oﬀer to those oﬃcers pecuniary incentives or well-
paid private-sector employment after retirement. In our experiment, however, there is
no possibility of corruption, because the computer program always selects the lowest
bidders as winners in any auctions.
Collusive bidding is possible in practices, particularly when the auctions are re-
peatedly conducted. (See, e.g., Aoyagi, M (2003) for more detail.) Limiting number of
bidders can also breed collusive bidding by alleviating competition. Accordingly, our
experiment is carefully designed so that subjects are supposed to be faced with one-shot
auctions; we draw dice to determine the role of each subject at the beginning of each
sequence of subcontract auctions and the subsequent procurement auction, and thus
each subject cannot identify which role a particular subject is playing as. Moreover,
it is impossible for every subject to communicate with any other subjects during our
experiment.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 describes our
model of procurement auctions with pre-award subcontracting and provides some the-
oretical predictions. Sect. 3 explains the experiment procedures. Sect. 4 discusses the
experiment results. Sect. 5 concludes this paper showing some future research. The
instruction of the experiment is given in the Appendix B.
2 Theoretical Predictions
Consider a situation where a procurement buyer solicits bids for a project from two
prime contractors (PCs), each of which is indexed by i =1 ,2. In practices, the project
consists of subcontractable works and non-subcontractable ones. In this paper, for
simplicity, there is only one subcontractable work for the project. Prior to submitting
3a bid in the procurement auction, each PC holds a subcontract auction by soliciting bids
from two subcontractors (SCs) which can complete the subcontract work. Let SCi =
{SCi,1,SCi,2} denote the set of SCs from which PCi solicits bids in the subcontract
auction. We assume that SC1 and SC2 are disjoint; neither SCi,1 nor Si,2 is allowed to
submit his or her bid to PC j,w h e r ei ￿= j.
Given the order of decision making as above, a subcontract auction is hereafter
called an upstream auction, and a procurement auction is called a downstream auction.
Let ti,j stand for the SCi,j’s cost for completing the subcontract work. We assume
that, for all i and all j, ti,j is independently and uniformly distributed over [t
¯
,¯ t]. For
both PCs, the lowest cost for completing the subcontract work is ¯ t, and thus they
make subcontract arrangement with a subcontractor. As explained in Sect.1. the cost
for completing the non-contractible work is normalized to zero for simplicity. Upon
solicitation of bids by PCi,S C i,j draws ti,j and submits a bid si,j in the upstream
auction. Collusive bidding is prohibited.
Each SC knows his or her own cost for completing the subcontract work, but no
one else can observe it. In each sealed-bid subcontract auction, only the auctioneer
and bidders can observe bids, and the lowest bidder makes a subcontract agreement
with the prime contractor. If the prime contractor wins the procurement, then the SC
obtains the subcontract work and paid by the prime contractor. Otherwise, the SC
obtains nothing and no amount of money is paid to him or her.
Let pi be the conditional subcontract payment PC i makes to the winning SC in
the upstream auction. The payment is conditional because it is paid if the PC i actu-
ally wins in the downstream auction. For simplicity, we assume that the mechanism
of the upstream auctions is given and either the ﬁrst- or the second-price sealed-bid
mechanism. Thus, pi equals the lowest bid in the upstream auction if the ﬁrst-price
mechanism is used in the upstream auction, while pi is the second-lowest bid if the
second-price mechanism is used. Furthermore, we assume that each PC sets a reserva-
tion price equal to ¯ t in the upstream auction. Hence, the lowest-bid SC will be selected
as a winning SC if his bid is equal to or below ¯ t, and the PC performs the subcon-
tractable work for himself otherwise. Since no other payment than pi has to be made,
PC i’s cost is characterized as ci =m i n {¯ t,pi}.
Given ci,P Ci submits a sealed-bid bi in the downstream auction which is under-
taken with the ﬁrst-price mechanism. Let V> ¯ t be the value of the project to the
procurement buyer. We assume that the procurement buyer sets a reservation price
equal to ¯ t in the downstream auction. Hence, the lowest-bid PC will be awarded and
receive a payment equal to his bid if the bid is equal to or below ¯ t.
Throughout this paper, we assume private values. The SCi,j’s cost ti,j is known
only to SCi,j. Furthermore, the PC i’s cost ci is known only to PC i (and possibly the
4SCs who bid for PCi), but not to any other agents in the game including the opponent
PCs.
In this setting, a dominant strategy for each SC in upstream auctions is to submit
si,j = ti,j if the second-price mechanism is used in upstream auctions.1 In contrast,
no dominant strategy exists in upstream auctions if the ﬁrst-price auction is used.
Instead, a symmetric increasing equilibrium bidding function in upstream auctions can
be characterized as follows. Suppose that all SCs other than SCi,j follow an increasing
bidding function σ : t → s where t ≥ 0 and s ≥ 0 are the SC’s cost and bid. Suppose
also that all PCs follow a symmetric increasing bidding function in the downstream
auction. Then, SCi,j wins if and only if his subcontract bid si,j is the lowest among all







This implies that in the symmetric equilibrium SC will bid as if he competes in a
procurement auction with 4 bidders. To see this, we take the derivative with re-
spect to si,j and replace σ−1(si,j)=ti,j. Then, we have the ﬁrst-order condition
(1 − ti,j)
3 σ￿(ti,j) − 3(1− ti,j)
2 σ(ti,j)=ti,j [1 − ti,j]
2. Solving the diﬀerential equation
for si,j yields the SC’s equilibrium bidding function as2
σ(ti|With DC) = ti +
¯ t − ti
4
. (2)
The symmetric equilibrium bidding function in the standard (no downstream compe-
tition) procurement auction with two bidders is given by
σ(ti|Without DC) = ti +
¯ t − ti
2
. (3)
These illustrate that only the ﬁrst-price auction induces SCs to bid more aggres-
sively, i.e., bid lower prices, as the downstream competition becomes more intense.
Because of the aggressive bidding, revenue equivalence between the ﬁrst- and second-
price mechanisms breaks down in the upstream auction.
As for eﬃciency, the ﬁrst-price mechanism in upstream auctions always leads to an
ex post eﬃcient allocation, whereas the second-price mechanism may not. To illustrate,
consider the case in which the realized private signals satisfy t1,1 <t 2,1 <t 2,2 <t 1,2.I n
1In this setting, revenue equivalence holds between English (ascending) auction and Vickery (second-
price sealed-bid) auction. Revenue equivalence in these two second-price mechanisms breaks down in
more general cases. See, for example, Chew and Nishimura (2003) for more detail.
2The equilibrium bidding strategy in the upstream auction with the case in which the signal is


























































Figure 1: Experimental design
this case, SC1,1 receives the subcontract if the ﬁrst-price mechanism is used; however,
if the second-price mechanism is used, the cost of PC1 is t1,2 which is greater than the
cost of PC2, which is equal to t2,2. Therefore, the most eﬃcient SC may not obtain the
subcontract due to the loss of his PC if the second-price auction is used in upstream
auctions.
Theoretically, the ex ante probability with which an ineﬃcient allocation occurs
under the second-price mechanism 1/3. Let tα denote the cost of the SC who actually
receives the subcontracted work. If we measure eﬃciency by computing the ratio of the
actual surplus of the allocation obtained by V − tα to the maximum possible surplus
V −min{t1,1,t 1,2,t 2,1,t 2,2}, the dead weight loss created by the second-price mechanism
in upstream competitions is 8.3 percent3 in expectation.
3 The Experiment Procedures
Our experiment consists of six sessions. Thirty six subjects of undergraduate freshman
students are split into six groups and each session uses one group. There is no previous
research on subcontract auctions, and thus subject’s behavior is unpredictable. To con-
duct detailed analysis on experimental observations, this research adopts the treatment
in which two PCs compete in the downstream auction in comparison with the control
in which there is a single PC (no downstream competition) as shown in Fig. 1.
Each experimental session is divided into three subsessions. Subsession 1 is a con-
trolled experiment; two subjects out of six are chosen as an SC to compete for a
3See the Appendix for how to obtain the value.
6#o fP C ( s ) PC(s) played # of SCs # of subcont. # of # of subj. used
by machine ? per PC auctions periods per period
Subsession 1 1 Yes 2 20 10 4
Subsession 2 2 Yes 2 10 10 4
Subsession 3 2 No 2 20 20 6
Subsession G1 2 Yes 3 10 10 6
Subsession G2 3 Yes 2 10 10 6
Subcont. auction Showup fee Earned point Number of Experiment Mean earnings
mechanism (JPY) to JPY ratio subjects date (JPY)
First-price 1,000 .2 6 Jan. 28, 2010 1,318
Second-price 1,000 .2 6 Jan. 28, 2010 1,599
First-price 3,500 1 6 Feb. 6, 2010 5,485
Second-price 3,500 1 6 Feb. 6, 2010 5,899
First-price 3,500 1 6 Feb. 7, 2010 4,927
Second-price 3,500 1 6 Feb. 7, 2010 6,335
First-price∗1 1,500 1 6 Mar. 26, 2010 2,185
Second-price∗1 1,500 1 6 Mar. 26, 2010 2,154
First-price∗2 1,500 1 6 Sep. 24, 2010 2,976
Note: *1: Subsession (SS) 2 is conducted, followed by SS G1 and by SS G2.
*2: SS 2 is conducted, followed by SS 3 and by SS 1.
Downstream competition is always undertaken with the ﬁrst-price auction.
Table 1: Features of experimental treatments
subcontract from a PC who has already been received a construction project at a price
equal to 2000. Each subject draws a production cost that is known only to him from
a uniform distribution on [1000,2000] that is known publicly. Then, subjects place a
sealed-bid on the computer screen and earn payoﬀ if their bid is lower. The subject’s
payoﬀ is calculated based on the mechanism (ﬁrst-price or second-price) of upstream
auctions which is given and announced by the experimenters. The remaining nineteen
projects are auctioned in the same manner. Two projects are undertaken in a period
so that there are ten periods in Subsession 1.
In Subsession 2, a procurement buyer auctions oﬀ a procurement contract for which
the procurement buyer sets a reservation price equal to 2000. In this downstream
auction, two computer-played PCs are solicited. Prior to bidding, each PC randomly
chooses two subjects as SCs. Note that the subjects chosen by a PC are diﬀerent
from those chosen by another PC so that four subjects in total are chosen in a period.
Similar to Subsession 1, selected subjects draw private information from the same
uniform distribution and submit a bid to a PC. Following an auction mechanism i.e.
the ﬁrst-price or second-price sealed-bid auction, which is preliminarily and publicly
announced by the experimenters, a computer-played PC selects an SC who submits
a lower bid in the upstream auction and decides the subcontract payment. In other
words, the cost of the PC to complete the construction project is exactly the same
7as the subcontract payment. Given the production cost that is unknown to both the
procurement buyer and the competitor, the computer-played PC submits a bid in
the downstream procurement auction. The bidding strategy the computer-played PC
follows is the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium strategy provided that the SCs follow (2).
The remaining nine projects are auctioned in the same manner for nine periods.
Subsession 3 is the same as Subsession 2 except that PCs are played by subjects. In
each period, four subjects are randomly chosen as SCs and remaining two are as PCs.
Although PCs are played by subjects, their action space is restricted on submitting
a bid in the downstream auction. That is, the computer program chooses the lowest
bidder in the upstream auction as the SC and makes the subcontract payment according
to the given auction mechanism of the upstream competition.
Other subsessions are conducted in a control experiment in order to check whether
the theoretical prediction holds even in more general cases. In subsession G1, the
number of PCs is three and each PC solicits 2 SCs in the upstream auction while in
Subsession G2, the number of PCs is two and each PC solicits 3 SCs in the upstream
auction.
The minimum unit of sealed-bids subjects can type on the computer is ￿1. Each
subject have an initial balance of either ￿1,000 or ￿3,500. Subjects who lose more than
the amount of the initial endowment will be bankrupt although nobody got bankrupt
in this experiment.
Since subjects randomly selected as a PC or an SC in each round, they have no
idea about whom they compete with in both up- and downstream competitions. This
is expected to help deterring the subject’s incentive to collude.
At this time, a computer program makes a bid on behalf of each potential PC so
that it maximizes the potential PC’s expected proﬁt, given the amount the PC has
to pay to its SC. We assume that the PC does not do any on the public construction
project; all of the work is done by the SC. So, the cost of a public construction project
for the PC is just the expenses it pays to the SC. So, the points for the PC is the
diﬀerence between the amount received from the government and the payment to the
SC. At last the payment to the SC is made by the PC who wins the project. The
payment received by a subject is counted for the sum of the total points the subject
earns in the experimental session plus the showup fee.
4 The Experimental Results
4.1 Overview
Fig. 2 and 3 plot subject’ bids and costs in upstream auctions which take place, respec-
tively, with the forms of the ﬁrst- and the second-price mechanisms. Fig. 2 illustrates
8that, in the upstream auction with the ﬁrst-price mechanism, markups (diﬀerences be-
tween bids and costs) are larger in Subsession 1 (no downstream competition) than in
other subsessions (a downstream competition between 2 PCs). In contrast, Fig. 3 show
that if the second-price mechanism is used in upstream auctions, subjects tend to bid
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Figure 3: Second-price auctions
FPA SPA
Subsession No. 1 2 3 1 2 3
Bids 1,592 1,583 1,548 1,461 1,436 1,506
Average Costs 1,446 1,498 1,457 1,491 1,480 1,536
Markups 146 84 91 -31 -44 -30
Bids 32,831 53,707 46,466 88,479 111,809 91,446
Variance Costs 76,975 86,291 74,161 78,914 87,992 77,271
Markups 18,116 8,626 8,240 5,781 7,085 4,388
Observations 80 80 160 80 80 160
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the results. The third row shows that the
average markups drop signiﬁcantly in Subsession 2 and 3 (84 and 91, respectively) from
that in Subsession 1 (146) if the ﬁrst-price mechanism is used in upstream auctions.
On the other hand, the average markups are almost the same between Subsession 1
and Subsession 2 and 3 (Subsession 1: -31, 2: -44, and 3: -30).
9Another statistical analysis also supports this evidence. Table 3 reports the Welch’s
t-test statistics which examine whether the means of bids, costs and markups are dif-
ferent between the paired subsessions described on the ﬁrst column. These show that
the means of the markups in upstream auctions are lower with statistical signiﬁcance
in subsession 2 (t-value: 3.360) and 3 (t-value: 3.027) than in Subsession 1 if (and only
if) the ﬁrst-price mechanism is used in upstream auctions. The results suggest that, as
theoretical model predicts, subjects bid aggressively in upstream auctions taking into
account the increase in the downstream competition if the ﬁrst-price mechanism is used
in upstream subcontract auctions.
First-price Second-price
Bids Costs Markups Bids Costs Markups
Subsession 1 vs. 2 -1.150 0.300 3.360** 0.179 0.349 0.729
Subsession 2 vs. 3 1.083 1.153 -0.522 -1.026 -1.163 -1.003
Subsession 3 vs. 1 0.280 -1.596 -3.027** 0.831 0.788 0.076
Note: Null hypothesis that the paired subsessions have the same mean is rejected
with * signiﬁcant level at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 3: Two sample t-test
For more qualitative analyses, we implement OLS and ﬁxed eﬀect (FE) regression
methods. Observed bids are regressed on costs, and FE controls for subject hetero-
geneity. The result is reported in Table 4. It shows that the aggressive bids initiated
by the downstream competition are observed only in the upstream auctions held with
the ﬁrst-price mechanism. Regression (1) and (2) show that the observed bids in Sub-
session 2 and 3 are 38.89 and 50.82 lower on average than those in Subsession 1 if the
ﬁrst-price mechanism is used in upstream auctions. In contrast, Regression (3) and (4)
have no statistically signiﬁcant dummies for Subsession 2 and 3.
Finally, the descriptive statistics of bids and costs for each of 18 subjects used in
our experiment are available in Table 5 and 6.
4.2 Aggressive bids in ﬁrst-price mechanisms
Throughout the experiment sessions, we observe the ﬁrst-price mechanism induces ag-
gressive bids in upstream auctions. Regression (5) through (7) and (8) through (10)
in Table 7 are the results of OLS regressions conducted separately for each experi-
ment session,4 which is conducted with its unique subject group. Subsession 2 and 3
dummies are insigniﬁcant in all experiment sessions when upstream auctions are held
4Day 1 experimental session is conducted on conducted on January 28th, 2010, Day 2 session is on
February 6th, 2010, and Day 3 is on February 7th. In each day, we run two sessions; i) the session in
which the ﬁrst-price mechanism is used for upstream auctions, and ii) the second-price mechanism is
used for upstream auctions. The payment scheme in each day session is shown in Table 1.
10(1) (2) (3) (4)
First-price Second-price
OLS FE OLS FE
Cost 0.7** 0.7014** 1.03** 1.03**
(60.28) (63.95) (80.79) (98.91)
Subsession 2 dummy -38.89** -41.23** -16.66 -11.24
(4.21) (4.73) (-1.67) (-1.4)
Subsession 3 dummy -50.82** -53.02** -5.76 -2.90
(6.36) (7.04) (-0.67) (-0.42)
Constant 586.10** 585.58** -52.154* -49.182*
(32.31) (32.53) (-2.56) (-2.44)
Observations 480 480 480 480
R-squared 0.89 - 0.93 -
No. subject IDs - 18 - 18
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses;
*s i g n i ﬁ c a n ta t5 % ;* *s i g n i ﬁ c a n ta t1 %
Subject ID is taken as ﬁxed eﬀect in regression (2) and (4).
Table 4: Regression result for bids and costs 1
with the second-price mechanism, and except for Subsession 2 in Day 1, these dummies
in all experiment sessions exhibit a statistical signiﬁcance if the ﬁrst-price auction is
used in upstream competitions. These indicate that, regardless of groups and payment
schemes, subjects in an upstream auction recognize the intensity of the downstream
competition and respond the change of the competitive environment as predicted by
the theoretical model.
Because of the aggressive subcontract bids, the revenue equivalence fails in upstream
auctions. Table 8 shows that the costs of PCs are 10 percent lower on average if the
ﬁrst-price auction is used in upstream competition than if the second-price auction is
used.
4.3 Overbidding in the second-price mechanism
As shown in Section 2, truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy for SCs in upstream
auctions held with the second-price mechanism regardless of their risk attitudes and the
intensity of the downstream competition. Nevertheless, subjects in upstream auctions
frequently bid below their costs as illustrated in Fig. 3. It is also noteworthy that the
“overbids” are observed regardless of the intensity of the downstream competition.
Furthermore, overbids are continuously observed regardless of whether PCs are
computerized or played by subjects. Table 3 reports the diﬀerence of mean markups

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
First-price Second-price
Session No. 1 3 5 2 4 6
Cost 0.67** 0.68** 0.77** 0.98** 1.05** 1.07**
(32.58) (39.12) (36.05) (50.49) (54.32) (51.55)
Subsession 2 dummy -22.38 -38.90** -53.41** -26.94 -11.63 -14.05
(-1.35) (2.72) (3.38) (-1.87) (-0.78) (-0.82)
Subsession 3 dummy -49.43** -48.59** -51.90** -17.75 8.71 -13.03
(3.46) (3.93) (3.78) (-1.42) (0.68) (-0.88)
Constant 648.17** 613.54** 474.96** 80.99** -98.64** -145.94**
(19.99) (23.46) (14.03) (2.62) (-3.15) (-4.47)
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.95
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 7: Regression result for bids and costs 2
Subcont. Auc. Form Mean S.D. Median Max Min
1st-price 1595.366 237.884 1555.5 2000 1100
2nd-price 1740.758 242.024 1788.5 2000 1002
Total 1668.062 250.595 1659.5 2000 1002
Table 8: Costs of PCs
on the theoretical explanation for overbidding in second-price auctions.
There are a group of studies which attempt to explain overbidding in second-price
auctions theoretically (e.g., Morgan, Steiglitz and Reis’ (2003)). A majority of these
studies assume that bidders have the non-standard preferences, which are broadly cat-
egorized into either spite or joy of winning.
In Subsession 3 of our experiment, three subjects form a team in which one plays a
PC and remainders play SCs to compete with another team. A team, on the other hand,
consists of two SC subjects in Subsession 2. Hence, in subsession 3, a lower subcontract
bid is a spite to the opponent SC but, at the same time, is a goodwill to the PC subject
since the PC subject will have more cost advantage in the downstream competition. In
contrast, no goodwill eﬀect exists in a lower subcontract bid in Subsession 2 where PCs
are computerized. If SC subjects not only care about the payoﬀ of the rival SC but also
about the payoﬀ of the PC subject, subcontract bids should be higher in Subsession 3
than in Subsession 2. However, we do not observe any diﬀerence in subcontract bids
in between Subsession 2 and 3. From this evidence, overbids are in general attributed
14more plausibly to joy of winning.
4.4 Eﬃciency
Our laboratory data show that the ﬁrst-price mechanism in upstream auctions con-
tributes more likely to the realization of an ex post eﬃcient allocation. To measure
allocative eﬃciency, we use the ratio between the sample mean of realized social sur-
plus (the social value of the project minus the cost of the awarded SC) and the sample
mean of maximum-possible social surplus (the social value of the project minus the
production cost of the lowest SC). All the descriptive statistics are reported in Table 9.
The numerator of the ratio is denoted by (A) and the denominator is denoted by (B).
Social Surplus Social Surplus
(A)/(B)
Variance t-statistics
Realized (A) Maximum (B) of (A)/(B) FPA vs. SPA
Subsession 1 671.9 699.2 96.1% 0.84% 2.4885**
FPA Subsession 2 778.9 798.6 97.5% 0.25% 1.9914*
Subsession 3 792.8 820.9 96.6% 0.54% 3.7110**
Subsession 1 673.1 677.9 99.3% 0.14%
SPA Subsession 2 772.8 835.9 92.4% 1.72%
Subsession 3 660.0 755.3 87.4% 3.64%
*s i g n i ﬁ c a n ta t5 % ;* *s i g n i ﬁ c a n ta t1 %
Table 9: Eﬃciency
Two-sample t-test statistics in the table compare eﬃciency between the ﬁrst- and
the second-price auction in upstream auctions for each subsession. It is shown that the
ﬁrst-price mechanism improves eﬃciency with 1 percent signiﬁcant level for Subsession
1 and 3 and 5 percent signiﬁcant level for Subsession 2. In addition, Table 10 describing
the ratio for each experimental session and for each subsession reports that the ﬁrst-
price mechanism in Subsession 2 and 3 always yields higher eﬃciency than the second-
price mechanism (e.g., 97.4 percent vs. 93.2 percent in Subsession 2 on Day 1). On
the other hand, there is no such tendency in Subsession 1. The eﬃciency in Subsession
1 on Day 1 under the ﬁrst-price auctions is approximately 6 percent lower than that
under the second-price auctions while on Day 2 that is approximately 7 percent higher
under the ﬁrst-price auctions.
4.5 Risk Attitude
Although observed subjects’ strategies are oﬀ the theoretical bidding functions, the
discrepancy can be well-explained by the subject’s risk attitude. As presented in Cox,
15First-price Second-price
Session No. 1 3 5 2 4 6
Subsession 1 93.2% 99.1% 95.8% 98.2% 92.6% 99.6%
Subsession 2 97.4% 98.7% 96.6% 93.2% 92.0% 92.2%
Subsession 3 97.3% 95.6% 96.8% 92.6% 89.3% 80.6%
Table 10: Eﬃciency rate for each experiment session
Smith, and Walker (1982), bidders bid more aggressively as they are more risk-averse.
Suppose the bidder i’s utility function is expressed as a power function:
Ui(y)=yri,
where y is the experimental payoﬀ and (1−ri) represents the Arrow-Pratt measurement
of constant relative risk aversion. Then, (2) becomes 5
bi = ti +




bi = ti +
¯ t − ti
2
ri.
These imply that both strategies move toward the 45 degree line although these are
never coincident with each other. In other words, regardless of the SC’s risk attitude,
the aggressive bidding caused by the downstream competition will be observed only in
the case where the ﬁrst-price auction is used in the upstream competition.
Our experimental result was fully consistent with such theoretical prediction. The
mean value of r obtained in our data was 0.76 with the standard deviation is .010,
indicating that subjects are risk averse. Nevertheless, they tend to bid lower prices in
the upstream ﬁrst-price auction if there is a downstream competition. We thus conclude
that risk attitude is not the cause of the aggressive bidding in the upstream auction.
4.6 Unserious Subjects
For subjects to be serious throughout the session, some experiments for auctions in-
troduce the procedure in which the subject’s actual earning is the sum of the payoﬀs
earned in some limited rounds which have randomly chosen by the computer. Subjects
are informed of the randomization but do not know which rounds are chosen. We do
not, however, employ such a random payment procedure for the following reason. In
5See Cox, Smith, and Walker (1982) for more detail.
16our experiment subjects are randomly assigned to be an SC or to have a rest. There-
fore, they do not know how many times they will be able to submit a subcontract bid
at any period in every session. This design helps them play seriously in every period.
In fact, we have no evidence that subjects’ bidding behavior changes signiﬁcantly
through subsessions. Regression (11) through (16) in Table 11 are conducted to compare
the subjects’ bidding behaviors in the ﬁrst- vs. the last-half periods. The fact that the
“ﬁrst-half” dummies are statistically insigniﬁcant in ﬁve out of six regressions suggests
that subjects behave the same in between the ﬁrst and the last half rounds in most
subsessions.
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
First-price Second-price
Subsession No. 1 2 3 1 2 3
Cost 0.59** 0.74** 0.73** 0.96** 1.06** 1.05**
(22.12) (33.98) (49.12) (33.47) (43.31) (62.67)
First-half auc. dummy -33.88* -3.14 1.96 29.6 -14.8 -17.4
(-2.31) (-0.25) (0.24) (1.84) (-1.07) (-1.91)
Constant 759.5** 490.5** 495.2** 37.54 -102.9* -83.05**
(18.42) (14.43) (22.37) (0.86) (-2.82) (-21.62)
Observations 120 120 240 120 120 240
R-squared 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.94
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*s i g n i ﬁ c a n ta t5 % ;* *s i g n i ﬁ c a n ta t1 %
Table 11: Comparison between the ﬁrst- and last- half rounds
It is thus hardly concluded that subjects turn to be less serious to play in our
experiment as sessions go on due to a suﬃciently large amount of showup fees or to the
lack of the random payment procedure.
4.7 More PCs or more SCs
Aggressive subcontract bids as a result of the increased downstream competition are
observed in more generalized settings. We conduct a supplemental experimental session
which begins with the control subsession where 2 PCs bid in the downstream auction
in 10 rounds and each PCs solicits 2 SCs in the upstream auction. Then, in the next
treatment subsession (Subsession G1), the number of PCs is raised to three keeping
other things constant. In the ﬁnal control subsession (Subsession G2), the number of
17PC’s costs PC’s proﬁt
Subsession 2,3 Subsession 2, 3
mechanism mean N sd mechanism mean N sd
First-price 1,439.1 180 153.47 First-price 147.21 90 77.20
Second-price 1,655.8 180 250.14 Second-price 163.07 90 111.04
Total 1,547.4 360 233.92 Total 155.14 180 95.69
Subsession 2 Subsession 2
mechanism mean N sd mechanism mean N sd
First-price 1,459.8 60 176.31 First-price 211.77 30 36.51
Second-price 1,618.2 60 264.88 Second-price 178.20 30 72.15
Total 1,539.0 120 237.74 Total 194.98 60 59.16
Subsession 3 Subsession 3
mechanism mean N sd mechanism mean N sd
First-price 1,428.7 120 140.33 First-price 114.93 60 71.80
Second-price 1,674.6 120 241.38 Second-price 155.50 60 125.96
Total 1,551.7 240 232.37 Total 135.22 120 104.10
Table 12: Mean winning bid and PC’s proﬁt
PCs is back to two while the number of SCs for each PC to solicit becomes three.
Throughout the session, subjects bid as SCs. Since the number of necessary subjects
are four in the ﬁrst subsession, two subjects out of six are randomly selected in each
round to stay away from bidding.
Regression 17 through 24 in Table 13 report the statistical results. In the odd
numbered regressions, the ﬁrst subsession (i.e., 2 PCs with 2 SCs for each PC), is
identiﬁed by putting Dummy 1 and 2 on the subsequent subsessions while in the even
numbered regressions, the second subsession (i.e., 3 PCs with 2 SCs for each PC),
is identiﬁed by putting Dummy 2 and 3 on the other subsessions. The t-statistics of
Dummy 1 and 3, which are 4.28 in regression 17 and 18 and 2.01 in 21 and 22, imply that
the increase in the number of PCs from two to three in the downstream auction induces
lower subcontract prices if (and only if when considering only the ﬁrst- and second-price
sealed-bid auction) the ﬁrst-price auction is used in upstream competitions. Dummy 2
in both regression 17 and 19 is signiﬁcant and that in both regression 18 and 20 are not,
which supports the theoretical argument that SCs follow the same equilibrium bidding
strategy in both cases i) 3 PCs, each soliciting 2 SCs and ii) 2 PCs, each soliciting 3
SCs.6 Similar results are also obtained when the subject IDs are controlled as ﬁxed
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The optimal bidding strategy is thus identical in both cases.
18eﬀect.
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
1st-price 2nd-price
OLS FE OLS FE
Cost 0.8041** 0.8041** 0.806** 0.806** 0.9877** 0.9877** 0.9942** 0.9942**
(63.49) (63.49) (68.57) (68.57) (43.36) (43.36) (47.84) (47.84)
Dummy 1 -40.86** - -42.15** - 32.70* - 27.44 -
3P C s( 2S C s ) ( 4 . 2 8 ) - ( 4 . 7 7 ) - ( 2 . 0 1 ) - ( - 1 . 8 6 ) -
Dummy 2 -49.40** -8.53 -50.71** -8.56 26.68 -6.01 21.69 -5.76
2P C s( 3S C s ) ( 5 . 1 7 ) ( - 1 ) ( 5 . 7 4 ) ( - 1 . 0 9 ) ( - 1 . 6 4 ) ( - 0 . 4 1 ) ( - 1 . 4 7 ) ( - 0 . 4 4 )
Dummy 3 - 40.86** - 42.15** - -32.70* - -27.44
2P C s( 2S C s ) - ( 4 . 2 8 ) - ( 4 . 7 7 ) - ( 2 . 0 1 ) - ( - 1 . 8 6 )
Constant 416.28** 375.41** 414.71** 372.56** -41.67 -8.978 -46.32 -18.87
(20.43) (18.70) (20.08) (18.23) (-1.13) (-0.25) (-1.28) (-0.53)
Observations 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320
R-squared 0.93 0.93 - - 0.86 0.86 - -
Number of IDs - - 12 12 - - 12 12
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Subject ID is taken as ﬁxed eﬀect in regression (18), (19), (23), and (24).
Table 13: 3 PCs with 2 SCs for e.a., 2 PCs with 3 SCs for e.a.
Now, we compare the ﬁrst subsession in this experiment with Subsession 2 in the
previous experiment; in both subsessions, there are 2 PCs, each soliciting 2 SCs in the
upstream auction. We regress the observed bids on the private signals. The dummy is
equal to one if the dependent and independent variables are picked from the previous ex-
periment Subsession 2 and is equal to zero otherwise. Unlike the theoretical prediction,
the regression result in Table 14 shows that it is statistically signiﬁcant that subjects
in Subsession 2 bid lower prices than those in the ﬁrst subsession in this supplemental
experiment. Taking into account the fact that all subject groups are randomly selected,
it is hard to conclude that this diﬀerence comes from the subject heterogeneity. Hence,
the subject’s bidding behavior may be aﬀected by the competitive environment of the
previous subsession. However, subjects in upstream competition do recognize the com-
petition in the downstream auction and bid diﬀerently if the ﬁrst-price mechanism is
used.
4.8 Change in the order of subsessions
We conclude this section by reporting the result that the aggressive bids are observed
regardless of the order of subsessions. In the ﬁnal experimental session, we begins by
Subsession 2 in which 2 PCs solicit 2 SCs for each upstream competition based on
the ﬁrst-price mechanism. Then, we conduct Subsession 3 followed by Subsession 1 in
which a paired subjects bid for a PC and there is no downstream competition. The
regression result of the observed bids on the costs in Table 15 shows that the order of
19(25) (26) (27) (28)
1st-price 2nd-price
OLS FE OLS FE
Cost 0.722** 0.722** 0.9969** 1.0027**
(37.89) (39.01) (28.27) (36.48)
Dummy -38.6841** -32.6429** 16.4836 8.6942
(3.44) (2.71) (-0.8) (0.16)
Constant 578.108** 571.006** -72.1702 -65.6597
(17.18) (17.05) (-1.13) (-0.73)
Observations 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.9 - 0.84 -
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, * signiﬁcant
at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Subject ID is taken as ﬁxed eﬀect in regression (26), (28).
Table 14: 2 PCs, 2 SCs for e.a. PC
subsessions does not aﬀect our previous results; subjects bid lower prices in Subsession
2 and 3 even if Subsession 1 is conducted afterward.
(29) (30) (31) (32)
1st-price 2nd-price
OLS FE OLS FE
Cost 0.769** 0.769** 0.769** 0.769**
(51.49) (51.49) (51.49) (51.49)
Subsession 1 dummy - - 40.186** 40.186**
-- ( 3 . 8 4 ) ( 3 . 8 4 )
Subsession 2 dummy -26.139* -26.139* 14.046 14.046
(2.17) (2.17) (1.35) (1.35)
Subsession 3 dummy -40.186** -40.186** - -
(-3.84) (-3.84) - -
Constant 459.448** 459.448** 419.263** 419.263**
(19.66) (19.66) (17.86) (17.86)
Observations 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.94 - 0.94 -
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, * signiﬁcant at 5%;
** signiﬁcant at 1%
Subject ID is taken as ﬁxed eﬀect in regression (30), (32).
Table 15: Changing subsession orders
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the bidding behavior
in upstream subcontract auctions that take place prior to a downstream procurement
auction.
To answer the following three questions, we conduct a laboratory experiment; 1)
20whether subjects play the symmetric equilibrium the theoretical research by Nakabayashi
(2009) proposes, 2) whether the revenue equivalence breaks down in the upstream auc-
tion, and 3) which mechanism yields higher eﬃciency, the ﬁrst- vs. second-price auction.
As suggested by the theoretical model, subjects tend to bid more aggressively in
upstream competitions if upstream auctions are held with the ﬁrst-price mechanism.
Although the observed bids in our experiment has a discrepancy from the theoretical
bid functions due presumably to the subject’s risk attitude, the aggressive bidding
in the ﬁrst-price upstream auction is indeed observed with statistical signiﬁcance that
causes the failure of the Revenue Equivalence in upstream auctions. On the other hand,
despite the theoretical prediction that expected proﬁts of PCs who use the ﬁrst-price
mechanism to select an SC is higher than those who use the second-price counterpart,
the subject’s earnings as a PC in our experiment are lower if they use the ﬁrst-price
mechanism in the upstream auction.
Unlike the existing experimental research regarding the eﬃciency on auctions, we
obtain a clear ranking in upstream auctions. Eﬃciency is higher if the ﬁrst-price auc-
tion is used in the upstream auction. Although the second-price mechanism tends
to yield higher eﬃciency in our controlled experiment, the existing of the downstream
competition overcompensates the eﬃciency created by the ﬁrst-price upstream auction.
An extension from this study can be the examination of the case where a PC uses
the ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction to select an SC while another PC uses the second-
price sealed-bid auction. Dividing two cases; one in which all subjects know every PC’s
mechanism to select an SC, and the other is that PC’s mechanism is known only to
the relevant subjects (the PC and SCs who bid for the PC), we will investigate the
impact of such mechanism choices on the strategy in the upstream auction and the
PC’s proﬁtability as well as the ex post eﬃciency.
Furthermore, the optimal reservation price in the downstream auction can be an-
alyzed in the laboratory experiment. As theory predicted, the downstream auction
satisﬁes the standard IPV environment since the PC’s cost is drawn from a distribu-
tion function which depends on the number of competitors. As a result, the optimal
reservation price in the downstream auction depends on the number of bidders. We
will conduct an experimental session for the inspection of optimal reservation price,
the results of which will be attractive for the real-world procurement buyers who have
always wondering such issues.
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if the ﬁrst-price mechanism is used in upstream competitions.
To compute the social surplus in the case of the second-price mechanism in upstream
competitions, let ti,j denote the lowest signal among those of the four SCs. Let also
ti,j￿ ∈ {1,2} be an index that satisﬁes j￿ ￿= j. Then, the probability with which is not
the highest is 2/3 regardless of the value of ti,j. Therefore, if ti,j￿ is not the highest and










On the other hand, if ti,j￿ is the highest, then ti￿,(1) gets the subcontract where i￿ ￿= i and
(1) is the lowest order statistic among 2 signals, t·,1,t ·,2. Regardless of the values ti,j and
ti,j￿, this situation happens with probability equal to 1/3. Therefore, the conditional






















which is 8.3 percent smaller than SSFP.
6 Appendix B: An Experiment in Subcontract Bidding
for Public Works
In this experiment, each subject (starting with you) is initially given 3,500 points.
Throughout the experiment, you may bring in more points, or you may use up all your
initial points. Each subject will be given a reward according to the total points he or
she has at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1 yen per point.
All the information we pass out here is for use by the subject only. None of the
information in this instruction is to be shared with any other subject. There is to be
no talking during the experiment. If someone breaks these rules, the experiment will
22be halted at that point.
6.1 Summary of Experiment
In regard to a public construction project, the procurement buyer (government) chooses
a company to commission the project and decides the amount it will pay out to the
company by means of public bidding, from the standpoint of fairness and cost reduction.
This company is called a “prime contractor”. The prime constructor usually has to
contract much of the project out to the construction agents. Each of these agents is
called a “subcontractor”, and each part of the project assigned to the subcontractor
is called a job. From the viewpoint of cost reduction, the prime contractor chooses
its subcontractors by having the agents make bids to see which agent has the lowest
estimate of costs for the job, where these bids are not disclosed to the public. This
experiment is done in order to investigate the interactions of these two types of bidding.
We have the subjects play the role of either potential prime contractors or con-
struction agents. The role of the government is played by us. The government ﬁrst
announces a public construction project. Then, it is shown on your computer screen
whether you are a potential prime contractor or a construction agent. If you are as-
signed to a construction agent, you must make a bid for subcontracting the project
indicated by a prime contractor. If you are assigned to a prime contractor, you must
make a bid to the government for the public construction project.
6.2 Process of Experiment
6.2.1 Subsessions and the Order of Bidding
This experiment consists of three sessions. Before each subsession starts, there is a trial
run of 3 periods. The results of the bids in this trial run account for nothing of your
total points. Any necessary information is shown on your computer screen.
Subsession 1 has ten periods. At the beginning of each period, two subjects
are randomly chosen as construction agents. The prime contractor is chosen by the
government a priori and it is commissioned a public construction project. Thus, there
is no public bidding for any projects. Each of the two construction agents is ﬁrst
randomly given an integer that ranges from 1001 to 2000 point as its construction cost
for the job of the construction project. This construction cost is the agent’s private
information. The agent who makes the lowest bid wins the subcontract bidding and
receives the same amount as the second lowest bid (the sealed-bid second-price auction).
The payment you receives as a subject is counted for your total point, but nothing is
counted unless you are chosen as a subject.
23Subsession 2 also has ten periods. At the beginning of each period, four subjects
are randomly chosen as construction agents. The government announces a public con-
struction projects and two potential prime contractors participate in bidding for the
project. Prior to this bidding, each potential prime contractor asks two construction
agents to make a subcontract bid. These two construction agents are randomly assigned
to a potential prime constructor, and each construction agent are ﬁrst randomly given
an integer that ranges from 1001 to 2000 points as its construction cost for the job of
the construction project. This construction cost is the agents private information.
A computer program assigns to each potential prime contractor one subcontractor,
choosing the agent who makes the lowest bid as the subcontractor. Each potential
prime contractor commits to a contract that if the potential prime contractor wins the
public construction project, it will (1) ask the subcontractor to do a job and (2) pay the
same amount as the second lowest bid in the subcontract bidding to the subcontractor.
If the potential prime contractor makes the lowest bid for the project, it wins the
project and receives exactly the same amount as its bid from the government.
At this time, a computer program makes a bid on behalf of each potential prime
contractor so that it maximizes the potential prime contractor’s expected proﬁt, given
the amount the prime contractor has to pay to its subcontractor. We assume that the
prime contractor does not do any on the public construction project; all of the work is
done by the subcontractor. So, the cost of a public construction project for the prime
contractor is just the expenses it pays to the subcontractor. So, the points for the prime
contractor is the diﬀerence between the amount received from the government and the
payment to the subcontractor. At last the payment to the subcontractor is made by
the prime contractor who wins the project. The payment you receives as a subject is
counted for your total point, but nothing is counted unless you are chosen as a subject.
Subession 3 proceeds in the same way as Subsession 2 except the following three
points. (1) Subsession 3 has twenty periods. There is an intermission of one minute
after ten periods. (2) Each of the two potential prime contractors is handled by a
subject, although a computer program assigns to each potential prime contractor one
subcontractor, choosing the agent who makes the lowest bid as the subcontractor.
So, (3) at the beginning of each period, six subjects are randomly chosen. Two of
the subjects are randomly assigned to potential prime contractors, two of them are
randomly assigned to construction agents who can bid only for a designated subcontract
bidding, the remaining two are randomly assigned to construction agents who can bid
only for the other designated subcontract bidding. The payment you receives as a
subject is counted for your total point, but nothing is counted unless you are chosen as
a subject (the sealed-bit ﬁrst-price auction).
Bidder asymmetry by Estache and Iimi (2010): Asymmetric auctions are among
24the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. although traditional symmet-
ric framework is still attractive for analyzing general bidding behavior in a tractable
manner, it is not always applicable in practice because bidders are potentially heteroge-
neous in various dimensions. The existence of weak bidders – also referred to as fringe
or entrant bidders – is particularly important from a competition policy perspective.
they can promote bidding competition and break hidden collusive arrangement among
strong bidders–also referred to as incumbent bidders.
6.2.2 More on the Process
The subcontractor’s construction costs are independently drawn from a uniform distri-
bution between 1,001 and 2,000. The closest example is drawing a dice. The probability
of a two coming up is 1/6, the others also being 1/6. In the same way, the probability
that the construction costs for the subcontractor is 1,033 is 1/1,000. On the computer
, the range of bidding for both potential prime contractors and construction agents is
also limited to integers that ranges from 1,001 to 2,000.
The winner of bidding is determined randomly in the case of a tie. Any periods
in any sessions should be completed in 60 seconds. When 60 seconds elapses, we urge
subjects to complete the period as soon as possible. For each period during a session, he
necessary information is shown on your computer screen,. Based on this information,
6.2.3 How to Calculate Proﬁts
If you are the potential prime contractor, the proﬁt you make from a public construction
project is
yuor proﬁt = the amount you receive from the government
−the amount paid to the subcontractor
This proﬁt may be gained if you are awarded the contract by being the lowest bidder
in the public construction project. On the other hand, if you are the subcontractor,
the proﬁt you make from a job of a public construction project is
proﬁt = the ayment from the prime Contractor − your construction cost
This proﬁt may be gained not only if you are the lowest bidder in the subcontraction
bidding but also if the potential prime contractor you are working with is fortunate
enough to be commissioned the public construction project.
256.2.4 Practice Questions
1. Suppose that you are a construction agent and your construction cost is 1,390
points. Now, you bid 1,390 points. How much proﬁt will you gain, when you wins
the subcontract bidding?
2. Suppose that you are a construction agent and your construction cost is 1,202
points. If, in the next period, you are chosen as a construction agent again, what
is the probability of your construction cost being higher than 1,500 points?
3. Suppose that in Subsession 2 or 3, you are a subcontractor of a potential prime
contractor. The diﬀerence between your bid and your construction cost is 265
points. If, later, your potential prime contractor is commissioned a public con-
struction project, what is your proﬁt?
4. Suppose that in Subsession 2 or 3, you are a construction agent and your construc-
tion cost is 1,530 points. Now, you won the subcontract bidding at 1,300 points,
but your potential prime contractor lost the bidding for a public construction
project. How much proﬁt will you make?
5. Suppose that in Subsession 2 or 3, you are a construction agent and your con-
struction cost is 1,880 points but you won the subcontract bidding at 1,700 points.
Let’s say that the potential prime contractor you are working with was commis-
sioned a construction project. How much proﬁt will you make?
6. Suppose that you are a construction agent and your construction cost is 1,240
points. What is the probability of your rival construction agent having his oe her
cost of over 1,500 points?
7. Suppose that in Subsession 3, you are a potential prime contractor and your
subcontractors bid 1,350 points and 1,504 points. How much will be the costs for
the subcontractor you choose?
8. Suppose that in Subsession 3, you are a potential prime contractor and your
subcontractors bid 1,090 points and 1,950 points. How much will be your expense?
9. Suppose that in Subsession 3, you are a potential prime contractor and your
subcontractors bid 1,090 points and 1,950 points. If you bid 1,057 points and
were awarded the public construction project, how much proﬁt will you gain?
Morgan et al. (2003)
26We study auctions where bidders have independent private values but attach a disu-
tility to the surplus of rivals, and derive symmetric equilibria for ﬁrst-price, second-
price, English, and Dutch auctions. We ﬁnd that equilibrium bidding is more aggres-
sive than standard predictions. Indeed, in second-price auctions it is optimal to bid
above one’s valuation; that is, bidding ”frenzies” can arise in equilibrium. Further,
revenue equivalence between second-price and ﬁrst-price auctions breaks down, with
second-price outperforming ﬁrst-price. We also ﬁnd that strategic equivalence between
second-price and English auctions no longer holds, although they remain revenue equiv-
alent. We conclude that spiteful bidding rationalizes anomalies observed in laboratory
experiments across the four auction forms better than the leading alternatives.
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